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More than 200 years ago in his work “Perpetual Peace,”’ Immanuel Kant called for peace
and human rights to be protected under international law. Ever since, the United Nations, which
was founded in 1945 as part of the worldwide fight against tyranny and heinous crimes, has been
considering the idea of setting up a permanent International Criminal Court (or ”Court”). Al-
ready in 1948, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of
December 9, 1948 (”Convention”) demanded the creation of an international tribunal. In 1993 and
1994, the Security Council of the United Nations established the International Tribunals for the
Former Yugoslavia 4 and for Rwanda. In July 1998 an overwhelming majority of States-including
Germany-adopted the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (or ”Statute”). By the
end of November, the third meeting of the Preparatory Commission for this Court will begin in
order to complete the necessary preparatory work for the entry into force of the Statute. Germany
wholeheartedly contributes to these efforts in order to ensure that the Court can commence its
work in the next years. The general debate of the fifty-fourth U.N. General Assembly focused in
an unprecedented manner on the question of humanitarian intervention versus State sovereignty.
These ”milestones” roughly describe the increasingly dynamic development of international law
and politics in the fight against genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. They describe
a long journey, which is still far from over.
Part I addresses the background and basis of the signatories of the Convention. Part II discusses
Germany’s policy belief that there is no peace without justice. Part III discusses the positive impact
that the establishment of the International Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda
(and other ad hoc tribunals) have had, but also how the effort falls short of universal justice. Part
III A. outlines the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court as a quantum leap in the devel-
opment of international law. Part III B. addresses the process of ratifying the Rome Statute as well
as a description of the establishment of a Preparatory Commission. Part IV discusses sovereignty
versus humanitarian intervention, the principle of non-use of force versus effective protection of
human rights. Part V discusses the importance of developing the existing U.N. system in such
a way that in the future it is able to intervene in good time in cases of very grave human rights
violations, but not until all means of settling conflicts peacefully have been exhausted and-this is
a crucial point-within a strictly limited legal and controlled framework.
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More than 200 years ago in his work "Perpetual Peace,"' Im-
manuel Kant called for peace and human rights to be protected
under international law. Ever since, the United Nations, which
was founded in 1945 as part of the worldwide fight against tyr-
anny and heinous crimes, has been considering the idea of set-
ting up a permanent International Criminal Court2  (or
"Court"). Already in 1948, the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of December 9, 1948
("Convention")' demanded the creation of an international tri-
bunal. In 1993 and 1994, the Security Council of the United
Nations established the International Tribunals for the Former
Yugoslavia 4 and for Rwanda.5 In July 1998 an overwhelming ma-
jority of States-including Germany-adopted the Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court (or "Statute"). 6 By the end
of November, the third meeting of the Preparatory Commission
for this Court will begin in order to complete the necessary pre-
paratory work for the entry into force of the Statute. Germany
wholeheartedly contributes to these efforts in order to ensure
that the Court can commence its work in the next years. The
general debate of the fifty-fourth U.N. General Assembly focused
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1. IMMANUEL KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE (Columbia University Press, 1939).
2. Karen Berg, A Permanent International Criminal Court, U.N. CHRON., Dec. 12,
1997, at 30.
3. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948,
78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
4. Statute for the International Criminal Tibunal for the Former Yugoslavia, S.C. Res 827,
U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993).
5. Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res 955, U.N.
SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994).
6. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature July
17, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 999.
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in an unprecedented manner on the question of humanitarian
intervention versus State sovereignty.
These "milestones" roughly describe the increasingly dy-
namic development of international law and politics in the fight
against genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. They
describe a long journey, which is still far from over.
I. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S STARTING POINT?
The intention of the signatories of the Convention, was to
avoid a repetition of the horrifying crimes during World War II,
committed by the Nazi regime that culminated in the murder of
millions of Jews and other groups regarded as "sub-humans"
from all over Europe. In the aftermath of the sentences pro-
nounced by the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg,7
the United Nations prepared a Draft Convention on the crime
of Genocide, which was adopted unanimously by the General As-
sembly with no abstentions on December 9, 1948 and came into
force on January 12, 1951.8 Today 130 States have ratified or
acceded to the Convention, including all Member States of the
European Union (or "EU") and all Permanent Members of the
Security Council. The United States ratified this important doc-
ument in 1989. Article 6 of this Convention stipulated, already
in 1948, that an International Criminal Court be created. In the
very same year the United Nations adopted the Universal Decla-
ration on Human Rights.9 A year later the Geneva Conventions
provided the hitherto most comprehensive document on hu-
manitarian law with provisions on the repression of abuses and
infractions. These provisions foresee the enactment of national
legislation to provide effective penal sanctions for persons com-
mitting grave breaches of the Conventions, i.e., war crimes. Simi-
lar provisions are found in the Additional Protocols of 1977 to
the Geneva Conventions. But, despite the growing and impres-
sive body of international law, the world community has been
almost helpless in the face of the failure of national criminal law
systems to punish the perpetrators of atrocities and those behind
7. Berg, supra note 2.
8. Genocide Convention, supra note 3.
9. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., 67th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
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them. Since the Nuremberg"° and Tokyo Tribunals,"1 many of
the worst criminals responsible for genocide, crimes against hu-
manity, and war crimes were never brought to justice, because
national courts had ceased to exist or were tools in the hands of
the perpetrators. Genocide, mass executions of political oppo-
nents, pogroms, "ethnic cleansing," and systematic rape went un-
punished not because of a lack of national and international
norms criminalizing genocide, war crimes, and crimes against
humanity, but because of the inability or unwillingness of na-
tional courts to act. This situation is the reason why the long
cherished dream of universal justice seemed to be hopeless and
was written off as naive or at least premature.
II. THE DESTINATION: WHAT DOES GERMANY WANT
TO ACHIEVE?
Germany's policy is based on the firm belief that there is no
peace without justice. Therefore the vicious circle of impunity
must be broken. When genocide, war crimes, and crimes against
humanity go unpunished, murder and torture will not only carry
no risk; above all it would be tantamount to a negation of the
very essence of justice. Together with our partners in Europe
and many parts of the world, we heed U.N. Secretary General
Kofi Annan's appeal to the General Assembly at the commemo-
ration of the fiftieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights: we want to globalize justice in the age of global-
ization. We agree with the Secretary General, who said in his
brilliant speech to the fifty-fifth session of the Commission of
Human Rights that "[n]o government has the right to use the
cover of the principle of State sovereignty to violate Human
Rights!" We want, and here I quote German Foreign Minister
Joschka Fischer that, "in future dictators and perpetrators of
Human Rights violations will no longer be able to rely on not
10. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of
the European Axis Powers and Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8,
1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 280 (entered into force Aug. 8, 1945), annexed to the
Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the
European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279;
11. Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Special Procla-
mation by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers at Tokyo, Jan. 19, 1946,
T.1.A.S. No. 1589, reprinted in 4 TREATIES AND OTHER INT'L AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA, 27 (1946).
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being called to account for their actions."' 2 This warning must
apply not only to the perpetrators of genocide, war crimes, and
crimes against humanity in Rwanda in 1994 or in the former Yu-
goslavia, but also to "ethnic cleansers," murderers, and torturers
everywhere. Obviously the international community has not
achieved this aim. A long way is still to be covered, and relevant
instruments of international law must be completed and imple-
mented.
III. AD HOC TRIBUNALS: A MILESTONE, BUT NOT THE
FINAL DESTINATION
The establishment of the International Tribunals for the
Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda by the Security Council in
1993 and 1994 was certainly a step in the right direction, if not a
milestone on the path to effectively preventing and punishing
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Germany
has been closely cooperating with the two Tribunals, swiftly en-
acting the necessary national legislation in this context and deliv-
ering one of the most wanted criminals to the International Tri-
bunal for the Former Yugoslavia. As the third largest contribu-
tor, Germany has provided about US$50 million of funding for
these Tribunals. Both Tribunals have passed important judg-
ments, which will help to interpret and further develop existing
norms of international law in the areas of war crimes and crimes
against humanity. Yet, both Tribunals fall short of our quest for
universal justice and our endeavor to fight the gravest breaches
of international law worldwide and for an indefinite future. The
two Tribunals are limited in their territorial and temporal juris-
diction.13 They, furthermore, do not cover the full range of war
crimes established under international law. Their legal bases are
Security Council Resolutions, which do not reflect the same re-
solve of the international community as a multilateral treaty with
a wide or universal acceptance would. The same will be true for
12. Joschka Fischer, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany, Statements at the 54th
Session of the U.N. Assembly, (Sept. 22, 1999) (visited on Nov. 24, 1999) <http://www.
germany-info.org/UN/un-state-09-22_99.htm> (on file with the Fordham International
Law Journal).
13. See S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827
(1993) (establishing international tribunal for human rights violations in former Yugo-
slavia); S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955
(1994) (establishing international tribunal for human rights violations in Rwanda).
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possible future ad hoc Tribunals, be it for Cambodia or East Ti-
mor.
A. Milestone Rome 1998
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court was
adopted by a Diplomatic Conference on July 17, 1998 with 120
States voting in favor (including all EU Member States), twenty-
one abstaining, and seven voting against. It has since then been
signed by ninety-two states, including all European Union Mem-
ber States, and ratified by six States: Fiji, Ghana, Italy, San Ma-
rino, Senegal, and Trinidad and Tobago.
The Statute is an important milestone, indeed. It marks a
quantum leap in the development of international law. There-
fore it seems appropriate to recall some of its most important
elements that prove its high juridical quality and wise political
balance:
" The principle of complementarity: The International
Criminal Court can only act when national courts are un-
able or unwilling to prosecute a crime.
" The limitation to four universally recognized core crimes:
Genocide, Crimes against Humanity, War Crimes and the
Crime of Aggression.
" The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court can
start investigations on his or her own initiative ("propio
motu").
" The Statute of the International Criminal Court provides
for automatic jurisdiction. The Court can exercise its ju-
risdiction if either the State of which the conduct in ques-
tion occurred or the State of which the person accused of
the crime is a national to a Party to the Statute.
" The U.N. Security Council acting under Chapter VII of
the Charter of the United Nations can refer situations to
the Court and can request the Court to hold an investiga-
tion or prosecution for a period of twelve months. 14
The Statute contains the first precisely negotiated and ex-
actly defined catalogue of crimes under international law, Arti-
cles 6, 7, and 8: Genocide, War Crimes, and Crimes against Hu-
manity. The definition of Genocide corresponds with that of the
14. See id.; see also, Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, Ch.
VII [hereinafter U.N. Charter].
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Convention. It is particularly important that Genocide and
Crimes against Humanity-for the first time exactly defined in a
treaty-may be prosecuted in all circumstances, not just when
committed in an armed conflict. Therefore, especially the defi-
nition of Crimes against Humanity, as contained in Article 7 of
the Statute, constitutes a very important, unprecedented break-
through in the codification of international law in this area. It is
also very significant that War Crimes fall under the jurisdiction
of the Court committed in international or in non-international,
internal armed conflicts, i.e., civil wars. Since about ninety per-
cent of all modern conflicts are of a predominantly internal na-
ture, this wide scope of jurisdiction is of particular importance.
The Statute contains in Article 8 fifty individual war crimes and
thus a very comprehensive definition, including grave breaches
of the Geneva Conventions. It is noteworthy that these final defi-
nitions were for a good part based on work coordinated by Ger-
many and prepared during two international workshops in Bonn
in 1997. Turning to the inclusion of the Crime of Aggression in
the Statute-a matter to which the German side has been com-
mitted to for a long time-the Statute contains a difficult start-
ing point for further negotiations. On the one hand, Article 5 of
the Statute stipulates that the crime is subject to the Court's ju-
risdiction. On the other hand, however, the crime has yet to be
defined-what exactly is aggression?-before the Court can ex-
ercise its jurisdiction. An agreement must also be reached in the
future on the appropriate role of the Security Council in this
context i.e., can the Court exercise its jurisdiction on the Crime
of Aggression only after the Security Council has explicitly stated
that an act of aggression has occurred? A definition elaborated
by Germany together with a group of other interested States,
which covered the most serious and obvious acts of aggression,
did indeed dominate discussions in Rome. In the end though, it
was not possible to reach consensus, because other States saw a
different, much wider definition of aggression or rejected a role
for the Security Council in ascertaining whether an aggression
has been occurred.
B. The Next Milestones Ahead
The early entry into force of the Statute and the swift opera-
tionality of the International Criminal Court are the main aims
for the coming months and years. The most important precon-
1999]
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dition for this is the ratification of the Statute by sixty States.
This process will probably last a few years, allowing States to com-
plete the rest of the work required for the establishment of the
ICC. Alongside with the adoption of the Statute, the Diplomatic
Conference in Rome called in a resolution for the establishment
of a Preparatory Commission ("PrepCom"), with a far-reaching
mandate, namely:
" elaboration of the Court's rules of procedure and evi-
dence;
" elaboration of so called "Elements of Crimes," which will
assist the Court to interpret the Articles 6, 7, and 8 of the
Statute;
" elaboration of an draft text of a relationship agreement
between the Court and the United Nations;
" elaboration of the basic principles governing a headquar-
ters agreement to be negotiated between the Court and
the host country;
" drafting an agreement on the privileges and immunities
of the Court;
" drafting the Financial Regulations and Rules for the
Court and preparing a budget for the first financial year;
" elaboration of rules of procedure of the Assembly of
States Parties.
On December 8, 1998, the fifty-third General Assembly adopted
by consensus a resolution establishing the PrepCom and a first
schedule for its meetings. The draft texts of the Rules of Proce-
dure and Evidence and of the Elements of Crimes shall be com-
pleted before June 30, 2000.
The first session of the PrepCom-February 16-26, 1999-
took place in a business-like, constructive atmosphere. Reason-
able progress was achieved in the field of the elaboration of the
rules of procedure and evidence. Also the first discussion of the
"Elements of Crimes" in accordance with Article 9 of the Statute
took place in a constructive manner. At the same time, it be-
came obvious that efforts to develop a complementary set of "El-
ements of Crimes" for all the definitions of crimes contained in
Articles 6 to 8 of the Statute will not be easy and will probably
consume much time and energy. It was particularly encouraging
that the U.S. delegation, which opposed the Statute, contributed
actively and with flexibility to the work of the PrepCom. The
second session of the PrepCom was from July 26 to August 13,
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1999 and showed even more satisfactory results. In a cooperative
atmosphere, major progress was achieved in the elaboration of
"Elements of Crimes." A working group on the Crime of Aggres-
sion was established to discuss this extremely sensitive issue in
depth, with a view to finding a viable compromise until the first
Review Conference. It was also established to consider amend-
ments to the Statute and convened seven years after the entry
into force of the Statute in order to adopt provisions defining
the crimes and setting out the conditions under which the Court
shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to the crime.
Germany is getting prepared to ratify the Statute in the very
near future. We stand ready to cooperate closely with our EU
partners, the group of like-minded States, and the non-govern-
mental organizations that all had an important impact on the
Statute and, thereby, encourage all States to sign and ratify the
Statute soon. Germany will actively contribute to the upcoming
sessions of the PrepCom in order to guarantee speedy and effi-
cient work. We hope that the States that abstained in Rome or
even voted against the Statute will soon "come on board."
IV. BEYOND ROME: "HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION?"
Sovereignty versus humanitarian intervention, the principle
of non-use of force versus effective protection of human rights
was the central issue discussed during this year's general debate
at the United Nations. And it was also the most contentious one:
what is more important, human rights or sovereignty? Which
principle prevails in case the conflict cannot be resolved other-
wise? Does international law allow a forceful intervention, as a
last resort, for humanitarian purposes even without the mandate
of a Security Council? About eighty heads of State and of gov-
ernment, foreign ministers, and ambassadors contributed to this
discussion and were deeply divided. The Secretary General him-
self took the lead in this important debate, selecting the pros-
pects for human security and intervention in the next century as
leitmotiv of his opening speech. In his trail-blazing speech, he
noted that state sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being rede-
fined by the forces of globalization and international coopera-
tion. And, he added, there is "the dilemma of what has been
called 'humanitarian intervention:' On one side, the question of
the legitimacy of an action taken by a regional organization with-
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out an U.N. mandate; on the other, the universally recognized
imperative of effectively holding gross and systematic violation
Human Rights with grave humanitarian consequences." Ger-
man Foreign Minister Fischer raised similar questions by asking
his colleagues in the general debate the following questions:
What is to be done when entire States collapse and a civilian
population is massacred in never-ending civil wars from all
sides? What if ethnic tensions in a State are partly provoked
by criminal governments that then respond with pogroms,
mass expulsions, and mass murders, even genocide? Should
the United Nations then regard state Sovereignty as more im-
portant than protection of individuals and their rights?
Rwanda, Kosovo, and East Timor are dramatic examples of
this.
The debate amply demonstrated that there is no consensus
of the State community on precedence of human rights over sov-
ereignty. It also proved that there are several schools of thought
as to the concept of humanitarian intervention. While the
United States, most European, and quite a number of African
and Latin American countries argued that Human Rights should
take precedence over sovereignty and that in exceptional cases
even a military intervention without Security Council mandate
might be justified, a number of other countries including China,
Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Sudan saw a clear priority for sov-
ereignty over human rights and expressed their adamant opposi-
tion to any kind of humanitarian intervention. Many others
positioned themselves somewhere in the middle. It may be con-
cluded from these speeches that the respect for human rights
over the last decades has gained in weight and is constantly gain-
ing in relation to the absolute respect for sovereignty.
V. AT A DIFFICULT JUNCTURE: WHICH WAY TO GO?
Contemporary international law establishes beyond any
doubt that serious violations of human rights are matters of in-
ternational concern. Such international concern has crystallized
into impressive networks of rules and institutions both at a uni-
versal and regional level. In the presence of genocide, the right
of States, or groups of States, to counter gross violations of
human rights has probably turned into an obligation (cf the
judgment of the International Court of Justice in the Genocide
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(Bosnia-Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia) Case of 1996). In such cases,
international law allows States, acting individually, collectively, or
through international organizations, to apply a whole range of
peaceful responses. According to the prevailing doctrine in the
law of State responsibility, developed by the U.N. International
Law Commission, the obligations of States to respect and protect
the basic rights of all human persons are the concern of all
States, i.e., they are owed erga omnes. In the case of grave human
rights violations, every other State can thus consider itself legally
"injured" and entitled to resort to countermeasures. But, under
international law in force since World War II and confirmed in
the General Assembly's Declaration on "friendly relations" of
1970, reprisals must not involve the threat or use of armed force.
Turning to the issue of enforcement of respect for human
rights by military means, the fundamental rule from which any
legal scrutiny has to proceed is Article 2, paragraph 4 of the U.N.
Charter, according to which "all members of the U.N. shall re-
frain in their international relations for the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity of political independence of any
State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of
the United Nations." This prohibition was and is meant to be of
comprehensive scope. Therefore, the question is whether, be-
yond the cases of Article 51 of the Charter (individual or collec-
tive self-defense) and Chapter VII (military enforcement action
mandated by the Security Council), the threat or use of force
can be justified in international law for other purposes.
The genocide in Rwanda and the more recent conflict in
Kosovo may represent important turning points in international
politics and international law. Here, again, I quote the Secretary
General who said before the fifty-fourth General Assembly:
"While the genocide in Rwanda will define for our generation
the consequences of inaction in the face of mass murder, the
more recent conflict in Kosovo has prompted important ques-
tions about the consequences of action in the absence of com-
plete unity on the part of the international community." In-
deed, how will the international community decide in the future,
when it comes to preventing massive human rights violations
against an entire people? Looking back to Rwanda and Kosovo
different developments seem possible: a practice of "humanita-
rian interventions" outside the U.N. system, i.e., without Security
Council mandate, could evolve; but this practice might endan-
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ger the imperfect, yet internationally accepted security system
created after World War II and set a dangerous precedent for
future interventions without clear criteria to decide whether the
preconditions for a humanitarian intervention really exist. Ger-
many believes that the intervention in Kosovo was justified, since
the Security Council had its hands tied and all efforts to find a
peaceful solution had failed. Kosovo was a special situation,
which must not set a precedent for weakening the U.N. Security
Council's authority on legalizing the use of force. Nor must it
become a license to use force under the pretext of humanitarian
assistance. This situation would open the door to the arbitrary
use of power and anarchy, and throw the world back to the nine-
teenth century.
The only solution to the dilemma, therefore, seems to be to
further develop the existing U.N. system in such a way that in the
future it is able to intervene in good time in cases of very grave
human rights violations, but not until all means of settling con-
flicts peacefully have been exhausted and-this is a crucial
point-within a strictly limited legal and controlled framework.
The U.N. Charter remains the proper basis for this undertaking.
The Charter is a living document, affirming in its very letter and
spirit fundamental human rights. It is our common task, politi-
cians, diplomats, legal scholars, and others to further develop
international law in order to effectively protect civilians from
wholesale slaughter and to harmonize this protection with a
modern concept of State sovereignty. To take up once again the
words of the U.N. Secretary General: there must be no contra-
diction between the concepts of State sovereignty and individual
sovereignty.
